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Guzman v. Johnson, 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 13 (Mar. 25, 2021)1
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: NRS 78.138(7) PRECLUDES FOSTER V. ARATA
Summary
This is an appeal on a dismissal of a shareholder complaint against individual directors of
a corporation and its controlling stockholder for failure to state a claim as a result of not rebutting
the business judgment rule. The question considered is whether NRS 78.138(7) supplants the
“inherent fairness” standard adopted in Foster v. Arata.2 The standard set in Foster requires a mere
allegation that a director was an interested party in the transaction in order to rebut the business
judgment rule as a matter of law and shift the burden to the director to prove the inherent fairness
of the transaction. In contrast, NRS 78.138(7) requires that the party rebut the business judgment
rule and demonstrate that the alleged breach involved intentional misconduct, fraud, or a knowing
violation of the law.3 The Court restated its ruling in Chur v. Eighth Judicial District Court, that
NRS 78.138(7) supplies “the sole avenue to hold directors and officers individually liable for
damages arising from official conduct,”4 and further clarified that Chur and NRS 78.138 control
on the present issue, abrogating Foster and Shoen5 to the extent that they conflict with the statute
and Chur. In the instant case, the Court ruled that Guzman failed to rebut the business judgment
rule and allege particularized facts demonstrating the requisite breach of fiduciary duty, affirming
the district court’s dismissal of the complaint.
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Foster v. Arata, 325 P.2d 759 (1958).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138(7) (2020).
Chur v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 458 P.3d 336, 340 (2020).
Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp., 173 P.3d, 1171 (2006).

Background
In August of 2016, RLJ Entertainment, Inc. (RLJE) and respondent Digital entertainment
Holdings, LLC (a subsidiary of respondent AMC Networks, Inc.) entered into an investment
agreement in which AMC, through Digital, loaned RLJ $65 million in return for the option of
owning at least 50.1% of RLJ’s outstanding common stock. The agreement also contained a “No
Shop Provision” which prohibited RLJ from considering any other acquisition proposal and gave
AMC the right to designate two directors to RLJ’s board and, upon exercise of the warrants in full,
the right to designate a majority of RLJE’s board. Nearly two years later in February 2018, AMC
sent RLJ a letter offering to purchase the aforementioned stock for $4.25 per share, stated that it
would not sell its stake in RLJ or be a part of any other process, and urged the board to form an
independent special committee to review the proposal. RLJ then formed a special committee
consisting of two of its directors, respondent Andor M. Laszlo and respondent Scott Royster (The
Special Committee). The Special Committee asked RLJ’s board for the authority to consider and
solicit offers from third parties, which was denied after AMC expressed disfavor towards the
request. Over the next 50 days, the Special Committee negotiated the merger, eventually settling
with AMC on the price of $6.25 per share for the outstanding common stock.
As of October 3, 2018, AMC owned about 51.9 percent of the outstanding stock and stated
that it would vote all of its shares in favor of the merger. The merger proxy statement was mailed
to stockholders approximately two days later and contained a contribution agreement between
AMC and respondent Robert L. Johnson (chair of RLJ’s board of directors). It also stated that the
Special committee and its financial advisor deemed that the merger was fair and in the best interest
of RLJ’s stockholders. The merger was approved on October 31, 2018.

A day before the shareholder vote that approved the merger, Guzman filed a class action
lawsuit against RLJ directors, AMC, and AMC’s subsidiaries, alleging a breach of fiduciary duty.
The directors and AMC moved to dismiss the complaint under NRCP 12(b)(5), arguing that
Guzman failed to rebut the business judgment rule in NRS 78.138, but Guzman countered that she
had done so under the standard set by Foster by arguing that the fiduciaries in the case were
interested parties to the transaction and that the burden was, therefore, on the directors to show
that they acted in good faith when negotiating and approving the merger. When asked to provide
allegations to support the claim that the Special Committee was not disinterested in the transaction,
Guzman responded saying, “they were at risk of being ousted and that’s not a good footing,” but
admitted to the district court that she had no specific allegations implicating the Special
Committee. The district court concluded that she failed to state adequate facts and the business
judgment rule applied, dismissing the action against all directors and AMC with leave to amend.
Discussion
Standard of Review
The Court reviews de novo, the order granting a NRCP 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss. Under
Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, this decision is rigorously reviewed on appeal with facts
alleged in the complaint presumed true and all inferences drawn in the complainant’s favor.6
Dismissal of a complaint is only appropriate if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff could
not prove any set of facts, which, if true, would entitle them to relief; however, because Guzman
alleged fraud in her claim, she must satisfy the heightened pleading requirement of NRCP 9(b),
which requires that allegations of fraud must be pleaded with particularity.7 The Court also reviews

6
7

Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008).
See In re Amerco Derivative Litig., 252 P.3d 681, 700 (2011); See also Nev. R. Civ. P. 9(b)

legal conclusions de novo and does not look beyond a statute’s language if the plain meaning is
clear on its face.8
The Inherent Fairness Standard is Precluded by NRS 78.138
The Court first discussed whether Guzman met the requirements of NRS 78.138(7), finding
that the inherent fairness standard as found in Foster is precluded by NRS 78.138, because the
plain language of NRS 78.138(7) requires the plaintiff to both rebut the business judgment rule’s
presumption of good faith and show a breach of fiduciary duty involving intentional misconduct,
fraud, or a knowing violation of the law. This, the Court says, follows the recent Chur decision
which held that NRS 78.138(7) “provides the sole avenue to hold directors and officers
individually liable for damages arising from official conduct.”9 If the inherent fairness standard
were used, it would contravene express provisions in NRS 78.138(7) and so the Court abrogates
Foster and Shoen10 to the extent that they conflict with NRS 78.138(7) and Chur. Guzman’s
contention of a rebuttal of the business judgment rule through a mere allegation is, therefore,
rejected and the Court proceeds to analyze whether Guzman’s pleaded facts would fulfill the
requirements set by NRS 78.138(7).
Guzman's claims for breach of fiduciary duty against the individual directors fail under NRS
78.138(7)
A claim for breach of fiduciary duty has three elements: (1) existence of a fiduciary duty,
(2) breach of the duty, and (3) damages as a result of the breach.11 The Court here found that
because most of the directors were not on the Special Committee and, therefore, did not negotiate
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or approve of the merger, Guzman failed to allege facts showing that those directors’ interests
affected the transaction and that they engaged in any intentional misconduct, fraud, or knowing
violation of the law in regard to the merger.
Furthermore, Guzman alleged that Laszlo and Royster, the directors on the Special
Committee, acted to protect themselves from being ousted from RLJ’s board, improperly advised
RLJ’s long-term revenue projections downward, and chose not to include a “majority of the
minority” provision in the merger. She also claimed that Royster’s principal income stemmed
from RLJ, that both directors had too few shares to be incentivized to negotiate to a higher price,
that they were enriched more by serving on the Special Committee than they would have been by
negotiating a higher sale price, and that both lacked the power to negotiate the sale. The Court
found these claims to fall short of the standard required under NRCP 9(b) and NRS 78.138(7) in
light of the fact that Laszlo and Royster had agreed to be removed from the board of directors as
part of the merger agreement and had negotiated for a higher sales price. Most importantly, the
Court held that Guzman’s allegations didn’t support her claim that the two were motivated by selfinterest to sell the stock, particularly due to her admission that she based her interested-fiduciary
argument solely on speculation that Laszlo and Royster were at risk of being ousted from the board.
The district court properly dismissed Guzman's claim against AMC
The Court analyzed the claims against AMC under the structure set by Cohen v. Mirage
Resorts, Inc., which provides that a dissenting shareholder who wishes to attack the validity of a
merger or seek monetary damages based on improper actions during the merger must allege
wrongful conduct that goes to the approval of the merger.12 They may also, under Cohen, challenge
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the merger process where it was procedurally deficient or approved on materially incorrect
information; it can further be alleged by a minority shareholder that a merger was accomplished
through the wrongdoing of majority shareholders and the minority shareholder can attempt to hold
the individuals liable for monetary damages under theories of breach of fiduciary duty or loyalty.13
The Court found that Guzman failed to allege particularized facts to demonstrate a lack of fair
dealing or fair price, which it says are the primary methods in which a fraud-based challenge is
made against the validity of a merger. The Court also found that AMC’s behavior surrounding its
status as a majority shareholder, statements on offers from other buyers, and ownership of RLJ’s
debt were contractual rights arising from the investment agreement, approved a great deal prior to
the proposed merger, and that Guzman further failed to show how these rights were used to force
a merger, or how AMC improperly influenced the decision to the minority shareholders’ detriment.
Guzman’s claims regarding the agreement with Johnson were also found to fall short of alleging
particularized facts demonstrating that AMC acted fraudulently or unlawfully.
Conclusion
The Court found that a shareholder seeking damages against individual directors and
officers must follow NRS 78.138(7) and abrogates Foster and Shoen to the extent that they conflict
with the statute and Chur. The Court also affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Guzman’s
claims.
Concurrence in part and Dissent in part
Justice Pickering wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. In her opinion,
she states that she would affirm the dismissal of Guzman’s claims against all individual directors
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(except Johnson), but would only do so on the grounds of the failure of the complaint to include
allegations sufficient to overcome exculpatory provisions in NRS 78.138 (7). In regard to Johnson,
Justice Pickering argued that the NRS 78.138(7) analysis would not be the analysis applied to the
controlling shareholder, AMC, or Robert Johnson. She said that while NRS 78.138(7) addresses
the business judgment rule as applied to a corporation acting through its directors, absolving them
of liability for damages for breaches of fiduciary duty not involving intentional misconduct, fraud,
or a knowing violation of the law, it says nothing about the duties that a majority shareholder owes
the minority shareholders. Foster, Justice Pickering says, still states the rule correctly, as NRS
78.138 only supersedes the rule in regard to directors. She also cites Cohen, which states that while
a lack of fair price may involve claims similar to those regarding the timing or structure of a merger
and claims that a price per share was undervalued, it can also include negligent conduct.14 Justice
Pickering ended by concluding that the district court erred in dismissing Guzman’s claims
regarding AMC and Johnson, stating that while she agrees that a transaction such as this one could
be structured to receive business judgment rather than entire- or inherent-fairness review, the
merger proposal included none of the features justifying such deference besides the creation of a
special committee, whose decisions were allegedly influenced adversely to the minority
shareholders. Under an entire- or inherent-fairness standard, therefore, Guzman’s claims against
AMC and Johnson are sufficient to states claims upon which relief could be granted. Justice
Pickering concurs on the dismissal based on NRS 78.138(7) of the RLJ directors, but otherwise
dissents.
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